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The Narrator’s Presentation of the Source 
Material in Philostratus’ Apollonius (1) 
 
Yasuhiro Katsumata 
 
Introduction 
 
Along with a growing scholarly interest in prose narrative works produced 
in the so-called Second Sophistic(2), more and more critics have begun to 
view the Apollonius (3) by Flavius Philostratus (c. 170-250 CE) (4) as a 
literary masterpiece. The work has no longer been regarded as a mere 
biographical account of the eponymous sage, but as a calculated artefact 
comparable, for example, to contemporary Greek romances (5). One of the 
most important factors responsible for its literariness is Philostratus’ 
employment of the first-person narrator; the story is presented through the 
vision of ‘I’ (6). As we shall see presently, the ego-narrator is alleged to 
‘rewrite’ the seemingly reliable document on the Tyanean hero. We have 
thus a good reason to say that what he offers to us is an ‘edited’ narrative, 
not an impartial report of the fact. In several ways the narrator can be seen 
as highly self-conscious about his act of ‘rewriting’. In this paper, I will 
explore one of these, i.e. the narrator’s presentation of the source material. 
In many places of his account, our narrator mentions, or just implies, his 
full use of the source material for informing us of individual events 
happening around the protagonist. I would argue that the foregrounding of 
his command of the source material itself plays an important role in 
Philostratus’ literary strategy. In what follows, I will examine the passages 
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in which the narrator talks about the source material and try to find their 
narrative functions. After a brief look at the narrator’s general aim for his 
task, I will first discuss the ‘Damis document’, the primary source for the 
entire story, and then focus on the narrator’s treatment of the document. 
These analyses will lead to the conclusion that Philostratus, through the 
exhibition of the first-person narrator’s information management, playfully 
draws the reader’s attention to the difficulty, or even impossibility, of 
attaining the truth. 
 
The Aim of the Narrator 
 
Before discussing the passages concerning the narrator’s treatment of the 
source material, it is necessary to grasp his aim with which he presents his 
own Apollonius. At 1.2, he complains of some people’s misunderstanding 
about Apollonius, saying that they see Apollonius as a ‘magician’ (μάγος) (7), 
not a man of ‘wisdom’ (σοφία) (8). With this in mind, he then makes explicit 
what he intends to do in the subsequent accounts: 
 
Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι μὴ περιϊδεῖν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἄγνοιαν, ἀλλ' ἐξακριβῶσαι τὸν ἄνδρα 
τοῖς τε χρόνοις, καθ' οὓς εἶπέ τι ἢ ἔπραξε, τοῖς τε τῆς σοφίας τρόποις, ὑφ' ὧν 
ἔψαυσε τοῦ δαιμόνιός τε καὶ θεῖος νομισθῆναι. 
Therefore, what I think has to be done is not to look over the ignorance 
of many people but to describe the man accurately, with regard to the 
time when he said or did something, and the uses of his wisdom by 
which he came close to being thought godlike and divine. (9) 
 
It does not matter whether such misunderstanding was really rampant 
among the people interested in Apollonius. The important point is rather 
that the narrator tries to present his work as a sort of reaction against 
other discourses about the sage. This way of presenting one’s own work is 
often employed by historians. What motivates them to write is, to some 
extent, the need to provide their own original ideas, different from those 
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held by other historians. In this sense, ancient historical writings are 
agonistic in nature (10). In the above citation, it would not be hard to notice 
such kind of agonisticity, because the narrator thinks it not good to look 
over the ‘ignorance’ (ἄγνοιαν) of other Apollonius writers (11) and announces 
his aim to ‘describe’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ (ἐξακριβῶσαι) (12). Assuming a 
highly agonistic attitude, our narrator presents himself as a historian (13). 
     A few more words should be added with regard to the word 
ἐξακριβῶσαι because, as we shall see in more detail below, the notion of 
ἀκρίβεια plays a key role in the narrator’s stance in presenting the 
biography. The idea of ἀκρίβεια must have reminded ancient readers of the 
name of a famous historian and thus helped connect our narrator to the 
title of the ‘historian’. The man in question is Thucydides. In the famous 
‘methodology section’ (1.20-22) in his History of the Peloponnesian War, the 
fifth-century historian uses the word ἀκρίβεια twice (14): in writing speeches, 
he found it difficult to remember the words and phrases ‘accurately’ 
(ἀκρίβειαν); avoiding both blind copy-making from other people’s accounts 
and subjective impression, he detailed each event as ‘accurately’ (ἀκριβείᾳ) 
as possible (both from 1.22). In addition, in the so-called ‘Second Preface’ 
(5.26) too, the historian tells us that during the war he took great care so 
that he would get ‘accurate’ (ἀκριβές) information. These remarks offer us 
every reason to believe that Thucydides struggled to give his readers an 
‘accurate’ account of his subject matter. Given Thucydides’ popularity as a 
writer of ‘accurate’ history in the Imperial Greek world (15), it is highly likely 
that Philostratus makes his narrator use the word ἐξακριβῶσαι to show him 
as a follower of the fifth-century great historian. 
To sum up, in the opening section of his biography, our narrator 
declares his goal to be to sweep away the ‘ignorance’ of many people by 
‘describing’ Apollonius ‘accurately’, showing himself as a historian, 
especially Thucydides, whose working motto is ἀκρίβεια, ‘accuracy’. It is 
against this basic stance that we should see the narrator’s ways of 
presenting his source material, to which I now turn. 
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The Damis Document 
 
After setting forth his aim, the narrator introduces the source material he 
uses for his job: testimonies found in the places that are strongly connected 
to Apollonius, reports by other writers and letters written by Apollonius 
himself (1.2). These sources are relatively unimportant, however. Much 
more important than these, and therefore worthy to be examined here, is 
the document written by a man named Damis, about which the narrator 
tells us as follows (1.3): 
 
Τὰ δὲ ἀκριβέστερα ὧδε συνελεξάμην. ἐγένετο Δάμις ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄσοφος τὴν 
ἀρχαίαν ποτὲ οἰκῶν Νῖνον. οὗτος τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ προσφιλοσοφήσας ἀποδημίας τε 
αὐτοῦ ἀναγέγραφεν, ὧν κοινωνῆσαι καὶ αὐτός φησι, καὶ γνώμας καὶ λόγους καὶ 
ὁπόσα ἐς πρόγνωσιν εἶπε. καὶ προσήκων τις τῷ Δάμιδι τὰς δέλτους τῶν 
ὑπομνημάτων τούτων οὔπω γιγνωσκομένας ἐς γνῶσιν ἤγαγεν Ἰουλίᾳ τῇ βασιλίδι. 
μετέχοντι δέ μοι τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν κύκλου, καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ῥητορικοὺς πάντας λόγους 
ἐπῄνει καὶ ἠσπάζετο, μεταγράψαι τε προσέταξε τὰς διατριβὰς ταύτας καὶ τῆς 
ἀπαγγελίας αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναι, τῷ γὰρ Νινίῳ σαφῶς μέν, οὐ μὴν δεξιῶς γε 
ἀπηγγέλλετο. 
I collected more accurate sources as follows: there was a very wise man 
called Damis, who once lived in Old Ninus. This man, having studied 
philosophy with Apollonius, recorded Apollonius’ travels, which, 
according to him, he himself took part in. He recorded Apollonius’ 
sayings, lectures and prophecies, too. And a man who belonged to 
Damis’ family carried to the empress Julia the tablets containing these 
memoranda which had never been known, and thus she knew their 
existence. She ordered me—I was a member of her circle and she 
praised and welcomed all sorts of rhetorical expressions—to rewrite 
the discourses and to pay attention to the way of reporting them. For 
the man of Ninus reported clearly but not skillfully. 
 
This is the passage inextricably linked to the core question of how one 
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should interpret the Apollonius as a whole (16). Though it contains dozens of 
important remarks that are to be investigated in their own right, suffice it 
here to focus on the underlined words only. The narrator introduces the 
document with the word ἀκριβέστερα. The document is presented as being 
‘more accurate’ than the other sources. In the following accounts, the 
narrator gives us the reason for its conspicuous ‘accuracy’: a man called 
Damis accompanied Apollonius all along during the sage’s worldwide 
travels and recorded what the man said and did. Damis is thus alleged to 
be an eyewitness of this mysterious figure. It should be noticed that the 
narrator emphasises Damis’ act of ‘witnessing’; as is well known, autopsy 
was thought to be a very important factor for ancient historians to confirm 
the veracity of what they recounted (17). We can easily find references to 
autopsy in e.g. Herodotus(18) and of course in Thucydides, who is 
contemporary with the Peloponnesian War (19). Our narrator claims that he 
possesses a document written by a man who saw and heard with his own 
eyes and ears Apollonius’ deeds and sayings during his travels, and in this 
way, as we saw above, the narrator again tries to present himself as a 
historian. The narrator has every reason to put an emphasis on the 
‘accuracy’ of the document. 
     Let us turn to the other underlined word. We are told that the 
document Damis had written was left to his anonymous family member 
and was then given by the figure to ‘the empress Julia’, who thus learned 
about the hidden document, and that she ordered the narrator to ‘rewrite’ 
(μεταγράψαι) what Damis had recorded. The exact meaning of the verb is 
tantalisingly unclear (20), but at least it seems certain that the narrator 
expects us to think of his present work as a factually reliable record, whose 
contents are basically the same as those found in Damis’ document.  
     We can find more detailed explanation about the document at 1.19, 
which helps us have better understanding of its nature:  
 
... διατριβὴν δὲ ἀναγράψαι καὶ συνουσίαν, καὶ ὅ τι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἀνατυπῶσαι, 
καὶ ὑπόμνημα τῶν τοιούτων ξυνθεῖναι σφόδρα ἱκανὸς ἦν, καὶ ἐπετήδευε τοῦτο 
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ἄριστα ἀνθρώπων. Ἡ γοῦν δέλτος ἡ τῶν ἐκφατνισμάτων τοιοῦτον τῷ Δάμιδι νοῦν 
εἶχεν· ὁ Δάμις ἐβούλετο μηδὲν τῶν Ἀπολλωνίου ἀγνοεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ 
παρεφθέγξατο ἢ εἶπεν, ἀναγεγράφθαι καὶ τοῦτο. 
He [sc. Damis] was very able to record the discourse and the meeting, 
to describe what he heard or saw, and to put these together as a 
memorandum. He did this better than any other person. Concerning 
the writing-tablet made of the manger, Damis planned as follows: he 
wished to leave nothing about Apollonius unknown, and, if Apollonius 
said or uttered something even in a casual way, to record this as well. 
 
The underlined phrase, ‘leave nothing about Apollonius unknown’, is to be 
noted. Damis is said to have aspired to record ‘everything’ about his beloved 
friend (21). His document is thus supposed to contain ‘all’ about the sage, 
with nothing omitted. 
     The thoroughness of Damis is mentioned also at 7.28, where the 
narrator informs us of what happened to Apollonius when he was in prison 
at the command of the Roman Emperor Domitian: 
 
Ἐγένετο καὶ ἕτερα ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τούτῳ ἐπεισόδια, τὰ μὲν ἐπιβεβουλευμένα, 
τὰ δέ, ὡς ξυνέπεσεν, οὔπω μεγάλα, οὐδ' ἄξια ἐμοὶ σπουδάσαι, Δάμις δέ, οἶμαι, 
ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ παραλελοιπέναι τι αὐτῶν ἐπεμνήσθη, τὰ δὲ λόγου ἐχόμενα. 
There were other episodes in this prison. Some were contrived, some 
were accidental—neither important nor worth my seriousness, which, 
however, Damis mentioned probably for the purpose of omitting 
nothing—and others were to be told. 
 
In this way, the narrator presents the ‘Damis document’ as ‘more accurate’ 
than any other material; Damis the ‘eyewitness’ took pains to record 
‘everything’ that Apollonius did and said.  
 
Damis’ Selection 
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As we saw above, the narrator seems to suggest that the Damis document 
contains ‘all’ the information about Apollonius, but are the readers meant to 
believe it? They are not. The reason for this can be found at 4.19, where the 
narrator tells us that Apollonius, so says Damis (ὁ Δάμις … φησὶ) (22), gave a 
large number of lectures in Athens and Damis wrote down ‘not all of them’ 
(οὐ πάσας) but the ones that were ‘indispensable’ (ἀναγκαίας) and were ‘on 
important matters’ (περὶ μεγάλων). This comment is a clear indicator of 
Damis’ selection of information in his note-taking. The narrator, though 
indirectly, discloses the fact that Damis did not record all of Apollonius’ 
deeds and sayings. The document made by Damis is presented as perfect in 
the opening section, but as we read on, we learn that the document is never 
free from defects. 
     Another signal of Damis’ information manipulation can be found at 
5.7. Before describing Apollonius’ discourses in Gadeira, the narrator says 
that, again ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις … φησίν), there were many 
discourses by Apollonius, but what he is going to tell next are ‘worth 
recording’ (ἀξίας … τοῦ ἀναγράψαι). The last phrase is important because it 
shows Damis’ selective attitude against his master’s discourses; if, as the 
narrator says here, Damis took one discourse as ‘worth recording’, then 
there must have been also the one(s) that was/were discarded by Damis as 
not ‘worth recording’. The passage thus implicitly reveals that Damis the 
note-taker omitted some words uttered by Apollonius. 
     The above examples show that the Damis document is never flawless 
as the narrator seems to suggest when he talks about the nature of this 
material. How, then, should we understand this contradiction? To answer 
the question, it would be helpful to remember the common idea that 
recording ‘all’ the information about a subject is impossible after all (23). No 
one could deny this, including the ancients who read the Apollonius. In fact, 
the narrator himself seems aware of this undeniable fact. Let us return to 
the narrator’s comment at 1.19. There, the narrator says that Damis 
‘wished’ (ἐβούλετο) to leave nothing about Apollonius unknown. Possibly, the 
implication here is that Damis just ‘wished’ and therefore could not achieve 
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the goal. The narrator’s language at 7.28 is more suggestive. When the 
narrator refers to those events in the prison which seem unimportant to 
him but are nevertheless recorded by Damis, he says that, ‘to his mind’ 
(οἶμαι), Damis mentioned them so as to omit nothing about Apollonius. The 
verb οἶμαι (24) suggests that the narrator is just inferring, not taking as sure, 
Damis’ effort to leave nothing out. To put it another way, he is cold against, 
or disrespectful to, Damis’ method; he shows himself as thinking that 
Damis’ plan will result in failure. Such ironical language as this, I argue, 
indicates the narrator’s awareness of the fact that the ‘perfect document’ 
never exists. 
 
Damis’ Absence and Apollonius’ Later Supplementation 
 
Let us look at another important aspect of the Damis document. As we are 
told at 1.3, Damis is alleged to have accompanied Apollonius during his 
travels (25), but we should not be unaware that Damis was not always with 
Apollonius; sometimes in his narrative, the narrator imforms us of the fact 
that Damis was made to separate from his beloved master for various 
reasons (26). In what ways, then, did Damis, who is said to have wanted to 
record ‘all’ the details about Apollonius, get information about the deeds 
and sayings of the man that he failed to write down on the spot? 
The first example is from 1.26, where Apollonius’ visit to the Magi in 
Babylon is described in a summary form. The narrator tells us that 
Apollonius spent time with the priests in teaching and learning. And then 
comes a striking remark that ‘Damis does not know (oὐκ οἶδεν) what kind of 
conversation Apollonius had with the Magi’, the reason for which, according 
to the narrator, is that Apollonius forbade Damis from visiting the priests. 
We readers may well feel uneasy when faced with this situation, since we 
expect Damis to have recorded ‘all’ the deeds and sayings of the sage. The 
narrator, however, tries to remove the readers’ confusion right away by 
adding that Damis asked Apollonius ‘later’ (ὕστερον) what the Magi were 
like. At first glance, we are meant to accept Damis’ ‘later’ obtainment of the 
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information as unproblematic in terms of veracity, but this is too simple an 
interpretation. The response Apollonius made to Damis’ question provides 
us with an interpretative clue. The sage, so recounts the narrator, said to 
the questioner merely that ‘They are wise, but not in every respect’. It is 
clear that Apollonius is unwilling to give information about the Magi to 
Damis, who is eager to know ‘all’ the details of the Babylonian priests, with 
whom his beloved master spent a certain span of time. 
     A similar information supplementation can be found at 3.27. Before 
he describes the conversation among Apollonius, Indian king Iarchas and 
another unnamed Indian king, the narrator informs us of Damis’ absence 
from the spot and his belated knowledge with the help of Apollonius, saying 
that ‘according to Damis, he himself was not there because of his stay in 
the village, but, having heard Apollonius’ story, he recorded their 
conversation in his notebook’. In this case, unlike the one discussed just 
above, the narrator does not tell us about how Apollonius replied to Damis 
the questioner. 
     Having seen these two examples about Damis’ indirect method of 
recording, we should consider it important that not all accounts in Damis’ 
document are based on the recorder’s autopsy and that the document 
contains secondhand information from the mouth of Apollonius as well. 
This causes a serious problem when we remember the narrator’s 
explanation that the Damis document is ‘accurate’; when Damis asked 
Apollonius for the information that had been inaccessible to him, it is 
highly likely that Apollonius did not provide Damis with ‘accurate’ accounts 
but distorted what he had really experienced. In fact, in either of the above 
examples, it is suggested that Apollonius, when asked by Damis, gave him 
an ‘edited’ version of the real story, because what Apollonius had 
experienced in Damis’ absence must have been secret and is not to be 
leaked to the people who were not present. Apollonius’ laconism in the first 
example clearly indicates this. So in these cases Damis seems to have 
written down Apollonius’ ‘edited’ versions. Are these accounts meant to be 
‘accurate’? The narrator, I believe, will answer ‘no’ tongue-in-cheek (27). 
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The Narrator and the ‘Truth’ 
 
Thus far we have focused on the making of the Damis’ record and found 
that it is never a perfect document but is subject to the recorder’s or 
Apollonius’ information manipulation. With this observation in mind, the 
next thing I would like to do is take a look at the narrator’s ways of making 
use of the Damis document. 
     Before examining the direct relation between the narrator and the 
document, it is necessary to grasp the narrator’s basic attitude about 
writing a ‘historical’ work, because it will help us gain a better 
understanding of the narrator’s use of the material available to him. As we 
saw earlier, our narrator aims to ‘describe’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ 
(ἐξακριβῶσαι) and his self-presentation reminds us of Thucydides’ famous 
comments on his working principle, in which we can find the word 
ἀκρίβεια(28). This is, however, not all that connects the narrator of the 
Apollonius with the fifth-century historian. Again in Thucydides’ 
methodology section, we can see another important element that proves the 
link between the two: ἀλήθεια, the ‘truth’. At the end of 1.20, the historian 
laments that ‘seeking the truth (ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας) is not painstaking for 
many people and they rather turn to ready-made discourses’. The phrase 
‘seeking the truth’ can be taken as the historian’s overall programme for his 
massive work especially because just after this he criticises poets and 
logographers for their incredible stories and tries to distance himself from 
these unreliable authors. He thus establishes himself as a man who seeks 
ἀλήθεια. 
What, then, can be said of the relationship between the narrator of 
the Apollonius and ἀλήθεια? The answer would be found at 2.9, where the 
narrator talks about a controversial action by Alexander the Great during 
his eastward expedition. Though some people say, recounts the narrator, 
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that Alexander held revel at a mountain in Nysa, the locals deny this. The 
narrator anticipates the possibility of making some people angry by 
introducing the locals’ opinion, but he then makes an excuse with some 
confidence, saying that he cannot do without the ‘truth’ (δεῖ … ἀληθείας ἐμοὶ). 
Just like Thucydides, our narrator presents himself as an adherent of 
ἀλήθεια. Taking into consideration the juxtaposition of ἀκρίβεια and ἀλήθεια 
in Thucydides’ methodology, we can safely state that in the Apollonius too 
the notions of ἀκρίβεια and ἀλήθεια are closely linked to each other. Placing 
an emphasis on these two, our narrator expects his readers to take his 
story as ‘true’, immune from any kind of forgery. 
 
The Narrator’s Loyalty to the Damis Document 
 
It is in the Damis document that one can find the ‘accurate’ information, or 
the ‘truth’, about Apollonius. So the narrator frequently emphasises that 
what he is telling to the reader is based on the document. A fine example is 
found at 2.28, where the narrator begins to talk about the banquet that the 
Indian king Phraotes held for Apollonius and his followers. There the 
narrator says that it is ‘not right to omit’ (Ἄξιον … μηδὲ … παραλιπεῖν) the 
banquet as ‘it is recorded clearly by Damis’ (σαφῶς … ἀναγεγραμμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ 
Δάμιδος). His language suggests that it is his duty not to overlook what 
Damis recorded. It seems safe to say that our narrator is very careful about 
the task of ‘rewriting’ (μεταγράψαι) the Damis document that the empress 
Julia entrusted to him. 
     Another example comes from 3.45, where the narrator tells us that he 
‘must not omit’ (μηδ' ... παραλειπέσθω) the discussion about the beasts, 
springs and humans in India as ‘it is recorded by Damis’ (ἀναγέγραπται τῷ 
Δάμιδι). This too indicates that the narrator carefully follows the accounts 
he found in the Damis document. 
     Just after this, we can find a more interesting comment made by the 
narrator, which will become important if we try to assess his basic stance to 
the Damis document: ‘there will be profit by neither believing nor 
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disbelieving all the things’ (κέρδος εἴη μήτε πιστεύειν, μήτε ἀπιστεῖν πᾶσιν). This, 
like Herodotus’ similar statement (29), makes it clear that the narrator does 
not force his readers to believe all of his accounts (30). Furthermore, it would 
not be an exaggeration to say that the narrator does not seem to take all of 
what Damis recorded as true. An important point is that our narrator 
appears literally to ‘rewrite’ (‘write again’) the contents of the Damis 
document and to be hardly interested in its historical veracity. The 
corollary of this is that he tells us a deed or a saying of Apollonius just 
because it is recorded in the Damis document. 
     The clearest signal of the narrator’s debt to Damis is his formulaic 
phrase ‘Damis says’ or ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις φησί(ν)). For instance, at 
2.10, the narrator tells us that ‘Damis says’ (φησιν ὁ Δάμις) he did not see the 
crag called Aornos. At 3.36, the narrator depicts the Damis’ reaction to the 
speech given by Iarchas, saying ‘according to Damis’ (ὁ Δάμις … φησιν) he 
was beside himself with amazement. At 6.22, the narrator closes the 
description of the discussion between Apollonius and the leader of the 
Ethiopian Gymnosophists Thespesion, by saying that ‘according to Damis’ 
(ὁ Δάμις … φησιν) the two talked about the just man as described in the 
previous sections and Apollonius approved the sound argument. This 
phrase (31) is the narrator’s favourite way to show that he always consults 
the document composed by Damis. When the readers light upon the phrase, 
they are expected to think of the narrator as being loyal to the record of 
Apollonius’ disciple. 
     It is in the very final stage of the work that we can find the most 
conspicuous expression indicating the narrator draws heavily on the Damis 
document. Having depicted the last brief exchange between Apollonius and 
Damis, the narrator says that ‘the things concerning Apollonius of Tyana (32) 
recorded by Damis the Assyrian ends with this story’ (Τὰ μὲν δὴ ἐς 
Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα Δάμιδι τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ ἀναγεγραμμένα ἐς τόνδε τὸν λόγον 
τελευτᾷ, 8.29). This closing remark leads the readers to think that what they 
have read until this point is all based on Damis’ record; they are made to 
feel as if they had long followed the Damis document itself with the help of 
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the narrator. This feeling would further be strengthened by the fact that 
the narrator just after the above remark informs us of the lack of 
information about Apollonius’ death in the Damis document and sets out to 
fill the gap with other sources. By thus distinguishing what he could find in 
Damis’ record from the information based on other sources, the narrator 
again emphasises that almost all of his accounts derive from the document 
composed by Damis the eyewitness. 
 
The Narrator’s Selection 
 
In this way, the narrator presents himself as loyal to the Damis document. 
It is wrong, however, to believe that the narrator’s story is a perfect revised 
version of the document without any flaw concerning the veracity of the 
Apollonius’ deeds and sayings. For in some places the narrator confesses 
that he does not always follow the accounts given in the document. For 
example, at 1.20, while he is well aware of the importance of ‘accurate 
account’ (Ἀκριβολογίας) and of his ‘omitting none of what was written by 
Damis’ (τοῦ μηδὲν παραλελεῖφθαί … τῶν γεγραμμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Δάμιδος), λόγος (33) 
forces him to offer things ‘more important’ (τὰ μείζω) and ‘more marvelous’ 
(τὰ θαυμασιώτερα). As we saw above, in the introductory section the narrator 
declares that he ‘describes’ Apollonius ‘accurately’ (ἐξακριβῶσαι), but here he 
admits his abandonment of ἀκρίβεια and the alternative method of selection. 
Despite his confident self-presentation as a devotee of ἀκρίβεια, he does not 
conceal the possibility of his information manipulation, adopting some and 
discarding others, in the writing process. 
     An interesting passage in connection to this is found at 6.35. There 
the narrator confesses the fear of his offering ‘a long story’ (λόγων ... μῆκος) 
by introducing Apollonius’ philosophy ‘accurately’ (ἀκριβῶς), and so tells us 
that of sage’s many philosophical activities he will talk about things ‘more 
serious’ (τὰ σπουδαιότερα) and ‘more worthy of memory’ (ὁπόσα μνήμης 
ἀξιώτερα). Striking is the narrator’s idea that ‘accurate’ accounts cause 
‘tediousness’. It seems unnecessary for the narrator to mention the 
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negative aspect of ἀκρίβεια, because the concept is his principle, his motto in 
writing the biography, but despite the disadvantage the narrator shows us 
his intention of abandoning ἀκρίβεια and instead selecting only some events. 
Here too the reader, who is promised ‘accurate’ accounts in the opening 
section, has no choice but recognise the information manipulation on the 
part of the narrator. 
     A similar association of ‘accuracy’ and ‘tediousness’ can be found 
toward the beginning of Book 7, the book in which is presented the conflict 
between Apollonius and the emperor Domitian. The narrator opens the 
book with enumerating the famous historical figures who resisted against 
tyrants, such as Zeno of Elea and Diogenes of Sinope, with a view to 
exalting Apollonius, who in like manner battled the Roman Emperor. 
Worth noting is the narrator’s conviction that the ‘truth’ (τἀληθὲς, 7.1) about 
Apollonius is attained only in this way. At one place in these accounts, the 
narrator tells us that even though many stories could be given about 
courageous resistance, λόγος (34) does not allow him to make his story ‘long’ 
(μῆκος, 7.2), suggesting that he is compelled to omit the behaviour of the 
figures that would be included in the accounts if λόγος permitted. This 
statement is surprising especially because it is for the obtainment of the 
‘truth’ about the sage that the narrator adopts such a comparative method, 
a roundabout, thus ‘long’, way. Clearly, our narator is well aware of the fact 
that in order to show the ‘truth’ to the reader, a narrator cannot avoid 
making his story ‘long’. As ἀκρίβεια is connected to ‘tediousness’, there is a 
strong link between τἀληθὲς and ‘length’, which our narrator wants to 
escape, and to do so he adopts and discards pieces of information as he 
wants. 
     The passages discussed in this section suggest that the narrator aims 
to offer only important things about Apollonius, abandoning what seems to 
him unimportant. This means that he engages in information manipulation 
work. The task of the narrator, so we are told, is to ‘rewrite’ the Damis 
document, to tell ‘accurately’, to offer the ‘truth’, but we must conclude that 
the narrator has no intention to achieve the goal. 
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Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the narrator’s accounts about the source material 
contain many contradictions and obscurities. The biggest factor that makes 
us think his explanation unclear is the ‘information manipulation’ by the 
people involved, i.e, Damis, Apollonius and the narrator. Damis seems to 
have wanted to record ‘all’ deeds and sayings of Apollonius, but he had to 
give it up since he could not always accompany Apollonius. This means that 
the Damis document is a far from perfect testimony. When Damis was 
made to leave Apollonius, he seems to have asked Apollonius himself for 
information after their reunion, but we are never certain what information 
Apollonius gave to his disciple and what information he omitted. Also, we 
know that the narrator does not offer all the information contained in the 
Damis document. Though the reader is supposed to be given the ‘truth’ 
(ἀλήθεια) about the protagonist, the ways in which these three people 
transmit their information remain unclear. We cannot say for certain which 
information should be trusted and which information should not. 
     Is it then appropriate to label the narrator as being ‘unreliable’ (35)? 
The answer is certainly no(36). It is wrong to attribute the narrator’s 
confusing management of the source material to his carelessness. Rather, 
we should notice the subtlety of Philostratus as a skilled author; the 
narrator, by Philostratus, is made to appear ‘serious’ (37) in presenting his 
source material. We readers, however, having signed the fictional contract 
(38) with Philostratus, are expected to know well that the narrator is 
controlled in such a way without his knowledge. One must not, therefore, 
regard the narrator as a teller of the ‘truth’ even though his overall stance 
to his source material is serious. Remember the narrator’s statement that 
‘there will be profit by neither believing nor disbelieving all the things’ (39). 
We can see in it the playfulness on the part of the sophistic (40) writer 
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Philostratus. Our author does not intend to have the narrator offer the 
‘true’ story of Apollonius all the readers are expected to believe. 
Philostratus seems to have been aware that information is distorted in the 
process of transmission. His foregrounding of the verb μεταγράψαι in the 
introductory section indicates the awareness. μεταγράψαι is the act which 
does not allow its agent to attain its principal aim, i.e. to ‘make exactly the 
same copy as the original’. As long as one engages in the act of ‘narration’, 
he cannot transmit the original data, the ‘truth’, to the narratee, because 
he is destined to distort it in spite of himself. Philostratus encourages us to 
participate in his metafictional game (41); he invites us to play with the 
instability and inconsitency that no information management can escape. It 
is in this self-consciousness concerning information transmission that the 
charm of the Apollonius lies. 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Texts, Commentaries and Translations 
 
Jones, Christopher P. ed. (2005) Philostratus The Life of Apollonius of Tyana, I 
and II (Cambridge (Mass.)). 
Russell, D. A. ed. (1992) Dio Chrysostom Orations VII, XII and XXXVI 
(Cambridge). 
Morgan, J. R. (2004) Longus Daphnis and Chloe (Oxford). 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Anderson, Graham. (1986) Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the 
Third Century A.D. (London). 
Belloni, Luigi. (1980) ‘Aspetti dell’antica σοφία in Apollonio di Tiana’ (Aevum 54: 
140-9). 
 
 80 
Billault, Alain. (2000) L’univers de Philostrate (Brussels). 
---. (2009) ‘Les choix narratifs de Philostrate dans la Vie d’Apollonios de Tyane’ 
in Kristoffel Demoen and Danny Praet eds., Theios Sophistes: Essays on 
Flavius Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii (Leiden), 3-19. 
Booth, Wayne C. (1983) The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd ed (Chicago). 
Bowie, Ewen Lyall. (1978) ‘Apollonius of Tyana: Tradition and Reality’ (ANRW 
II 16.2: 1652-99). 
---. (1994) ‘Philostratus: Writer of Fiction’ in J. R. Morgan and Richard 
Stoneman eds., Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context (London), 
181-99. 
---. (2009) ‘Philostratus: The Life of a Sophist’ in Ewen Bowie and Jaś Elsner 
eds., Philostratus (Cambridge), 19-32. 
de Lannoy, Ludo. (1997) ‘Le problème des Philostrate (État de la question)’ 
(ANRW II 34.3: 2363-449). 
Dzielska, Maria. (1986) Apollonius of Tyana in Legend and History, trans. Piotr 
Pieńkowski (Rome). 
Flinterman, Jaap-Jan. (1995) Power, Paideia and Pythagoreanism: Greek 
Identity, Conceptions of the Relationship between Philosophers and 
Monarchs and Political Ideas in Philostratus’ Life of Apollonius 
(Amsterdam). 
---. (2009) ‘‘The Ancestor of My Wisdom’: Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in 
Life of Apollonius’ in Ewen Bowie and Jaś Elsner eds., Philostratus 
(Cambridge), 155-175. 
Francis, James A. (1995) Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and Authority in the 
Second Century Pagan World (University Park). 
---. (1998) ‘Truthful Fiction: New Questions to Old Answers on Philostratus’Life 
of Apollonius’ (AJPh 119: 419-41). 
Grosso, F. (1954) ‘La Vita di Apollonio di Tiana come fonte storica’ (Acme 7: 
333-532). 
Guez, Jean-Philippe. (2009) ‘To Reason and to Marvel: Images of the Reader in 
the Life of Apollonius’ in Michael Paschalis, Stelios Panayotakis and 
Gareth Schmeling eds., Readers and Writers in the Ancient Novel 
 
 81 
(Groningen), 241-53. 
Gyselinck, Wannes, and Kristoffel Demoen. (2009) ‘Author and Narrator: 
Fiction and Metafiction in Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii’ in Kristoffel 
Demoen and Danny Praet eds., Theios Sophistes: Essays on Flavius 
Philostratus’ Vita Apollonii (Leiden), 95-127. 
Hägg, Tomas. (2012) The Art of Biography in Antiquity (Cambridge). 
Jones, Christopher P. (2006) ‘Apollonius of Tyana in Late Antiquity’ in Scott 
Fitzgerald Johnson ed., Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, 
Didacticism, Classicism (Aldershot). 
Kemezis, Adam. (2014) ‘Roman Politics and the Fictional Narrator in 
Philostratus’ Apollonius’ (ClAnt 33: 61-101). 
Knoles, Thomas Gregory. (1981) Literary Technique and Theme in Philostratus’ 
Life of Apollonius of Tyana, Diss., Rutgers University. 
Kuhn, Thomas. (2014) ‘Ἀκρίβεια in Geschichtsschreibung und Roman: Von 
Thukydides zu Chariton’ (Gymnasium 121: 131-53). 
Marincola, John. (1997) Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography 
(Cambridge). 
Mesk, Josef. (1919) ‘Die Damisquelle des Philostratos in der Biographie des 
Apollonios von Tyana’ (WS 41: 121-38). 
Meyer, Eduard. (1917) ‘Apollonios von Tyana und die Biographie des 
Philostratos’ (Hermes 52: 371-424). 
Miller, J. (1907) ‘Die Damispapiere in Philostratos Apolloniosbiographie’ 
(Philologus 66: 511-25). 
Möllendorff, Peter von. (2000) Auf der Suche nach der verlogenen Wahrheit: 
Lukians Wahre Geshichten (Tübingen). 
Morgan, J. R. (1993) ‘Make-Believe and Make Believe: The Fictionality of the 
Greek Novels’ in Christopher Gill and T. P. Wiseman eds., Lies and Fiction 
in the Ancient World (Exeter), 175-229. 
Ní Mheallaigh, Karen. (2008) ‘Pseudo-Documentarism and the Limits of Ancient 
Fiction’ (AJPh 129: 403-31). 
Raynor, D. H. (1984) ‘Moeragenes and Philostratus: Two Views of Apollonius of 
Tyana’ (CQ 34: 222-6). 
 
 82 
Reardon, B. P. (1971) Courants littéraires grecs des IIe et IIIe siècles après J.-C. 
(Paris). 
Reitzenstein, R. (1906) Hellenistische Wundererzählungen (Leipzig). 
Robiano, Patrick. (2001) ‘Un discours encomiastique: En l’honneur d’Apollonios 
de Tyane’ (REG 114: 637-46). 
Schirren, Thomas. (2005) Philosophos Bios: Die antike Philosophenbiographie 
als symbolische Form. Studien zur Vita Apollonii des Philostrat 
(Heidelberg). 
Schmitz, Thomas. (2009) ‘Narrator and Audience in Philostratus’ Lives of the 
Sophists’ in Ewen Bowie and Jaś Elsner eds., Philostratus (Cambridge), 
49-68. 
Solmsen, Friedrich. (1940) ‘Some Works of Philostratus the Elder’ (TAPhA 71: 
556-72). 
Speyer, Wolfgang. (1974) ‘Zum Bild des Apollonios von Tyana bei Heiden und 
Christen’ (JbAC 17: 47-63). 
Whitmarsh, Tim. (2001) Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics 
of Imitation (Oxford). 
---. (2004) ‘Philostratus’ in Irene de Jong, René Nünlist and Angus Bowie eds., 
Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature 
(Leiden), 423-39. 
---. (2005) The Second Sophistic (Oxford). 
---. ed. (2008) The Cambridge Companion to the Greek and Roman Novel 
(Cambridge). 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
(1) This article is based on the paper given at the 13th Colloquium of the Society 
for Greco-Roman Mythology held on 1 August 2015. I would like to express my 
gratitude to all the attendants of the meeting for their comments and 
suggestions. Special thanks are due to Prof. Martin Ciesko, who not only 
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corrected my English but also continued to encourage me to make my 
argument stronger throughout the writing process. I also wish to thank the 
anonymous referee for the valuable advice. 
(2) To name just a few, Möllendorff (2000) on Lucian’s True Histories, Russel ed. 
(1992) on Dio Chrysostom’s Euboean Discourse (Or. 7) and Whitmarsh ed. 
(2008) on Greek romances. For the Second Sophistic period in general, see 
Whitmarsh (2005). 
(3) I prefer the title Apollonius to the one most scholars adopt, The Life of 
Apollonius. The biggest, and to my mind strongest, reason for this is that we 
can find in the work itself the self-defining phrase ‘the things concerning 
Apollonius of Tyana’ (Τὰ … ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον τὸν Τυανέα (8.29)). In addition, in the 
same author’s Lives of the Sophists the work is referred to as ‘the things 
concerning Apollonius’ (τοῖς ἐς Ἀπολλώνιον (570)). As Robiano (2001), 637-8 
emphasises, the preposition ἐς may mean ‘in honour of ’, but what is presented 
in our work seems to suggest that Philostratus’ main focus is not necessarily on 
praising the protagonist. Cf. Hägg (2012), 319-320 and Flinterman (2009), 155 
n. 1. 
(4) Scholars agree that the work is immune from the notorious question of the 
‘Philostrati’ and attribution. For this, see de Lannoy (1997), Solmsen (1940), 
Anderson (1986), 1-22, Billault (2000), 5-31, Flinterman (1995), 5-51 and Bowie 
(2009). 
(5) For the similarity, see Reardon (1971), 189, Bowie (1978), 1663-7, Anderson 
(1986), 229-32 and Bowie (1994), 187-96. 
(6) Knoles (1981), 25-62 paved the splendid way for the subject. Whitmarsh 
(2004), Gyselinck and Demoen (2009) and Kemezis (2014), 63-78 are the most 
important recent contributions. My argument owes much to these studies. 
Schmitz (2009) shares the same concern in discussing the Lives of the 
Sophists.  
(7) Moeragenes, whose four books on Apollonius the narrator disparages (1.3), is 
said to have called Apollonius μάγος καὶ φιλόσοφος (Origen. Cels. 6.41). For 
Moeragenes, see Raynor (1984), Bowie (1978), 1673-9 and Flinterman (1995), 
69-70. In Cassius Dio, Apollonius is mentioned as καὶ γόης καὶ μάγος ἀκριβής 
(77.18.4). In Lucian’s Alexander the False Prophet, a follower of Apollonius is 
called γόης (5) (cf. Dzielska (1986), 86-9). A passage from Eusebius’ Reply to 
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Hierocles testifies to people’s deep-seated conception of Apollonius as a γόης 
(μόνον γόητα πάλαι τε καὶ εἰσέτι νῦν νενομίσθαι, 44.2 Jones). Francis (1995), 90-7 
discusses the meanings of these appellations to Apollonius. For the ancients’ 
representations of Apollonius in general, see Speyer (1974) and Jones (2006). 
(8) For this thematically important concept, see Belloni (1980).  
(9) The Greek texts of the Apollonius are from the Loeb editions (Jones ed. 
(2005)) and the translations are all mine. 
(10) Marincola (1997), 225-36. 
(11) It should also be noted that the narrator begins to talk about Apollonius 
with the words ‘people do not know [sc. Apollonius] at all (οὔπω … γιγνώσκουσιν)’ 
(1.2), and closes the prefatory section of the work with the words ‘May lovers of 
learning learn about the things of which they have no knowledge (μήπω 
γιγνώσκουσιν)’ (1.3). Also noticeable is the reason why the narrator rejects using 
the work on Apollonius written by Moeragenes. According to the narrator, 
Moeragenes ‘is ignorant (ἀγνοήσαντι) about the man [sc. Apollonius] in many 
respects’ (1.3). 
(12) A similar statement is found at 5.39 (‘ … my object is not to slander him [sc. 
Apollonius] but to offer the life of Apollonius to those who have no knowledge of 
it’ (οὐ … ἐκεῖνον διαβαλεῖν προὐθέμην, ἀλλὰ παραδοῦναι τὸν Ἀπολλωνίου βίον τοῖς μήπω 
εἰδόσι)). Cf. 6.35: ‘… the story, which I take huge pains to offer to those who are 
unfamiliar with the man [sc. Apollonius] (… λόγον, ὃν οὐκ ἀπόνως παραδίδομεν τοῖς 
ἀπείροις τοῦ ἀνδρός)’.  
(13) Whitmarsh (2004), 424-6. 
(14) A more thorough analysis than the present discussion is found at Kuhn 
(2014), 134-9. See also Marincola (1997), 86 with other studies cited there. 
(15) Luc. Hist.Conscr. 42, D.H. Th. 7-8.  
(16) Simply put, the central issue is whether the Apollonius is a history or a 
fiction. If Damis really existed and left the document, the work is historically 
true, but, on the other hand, if Damis was invented by Philostratus, the work 
is a fiction. The early twentieth-century Germany saw the first heated 
discussion (Reitzenstein (1906), 39-54, Miller (1907) and Mesk (1919)) and 
especially influential was Meyer (1917), who concluded that Damis was an 
invention. This idea had been dominant until Grosso (1954) offered the view 
that the work was historically valid. His study, however, caused Bowie (1978) 
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to reassert the fictionality of the work. Against his opinion, again, Anderson 
(1986), 155-73 argued for the possibility of Damis as a historical figure. 
Meanwhile, Dzielska (1986), 19-50 was in favour of the idea that Damis was 
fictional, and Flinterman (1995), 67-88 stated that Damis’ document should be 
taken seriously. Francis (1998), drawing on Morgan (1993), deconstructed the 
simplistic dichotomy of ‘history’ or ‘fiction’ and pointed out the similarlity 
underlying these two categories. I do not intend to get involved in this debate 
too deeply. What my paper concerns itself with is rather how Philostratus 
makes the narrator present Damis’ document, whether it is real or fictional. 
(17) Marincola (1997), 63-86. 
(18) E.g. 2.29.1, 2.44.1-4, 4.81.1. 
(19) 1.1.1: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ 
Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας 
μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων, τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές 
τε ᾖσαν ἐς αὐτὸν ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὁρῶν 
ξυνιστάμενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ μὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούμενον.  
(20) The verb occurs also at 2.14 and this is the only example found in the 
Apollonius other than the one discussed here. After Apollonius’ presentation of 
several examples about an animal parent loving its children, Damis is 
reminded of a verse from Euripedes’ Andromache, ‘So for all humans children 
are their life’ (418-9) and says that Apollonius seems to ‘rewrite’ (μεταγράφειν) it 
into ‘So for all animals children are their life’. An interesting parallel with 
Philostratus’ use of the verb is found in the preface of Longus’ Daphnis and 
Chloe, where the narrator (likewise ‘I’), having seen a beautiful painting in a 
forest, expresses his own attempt as ‘writing against(?) the painting’ (ἀντιγράψαι 
τῇ γραφῇ, Praef. 3) For the expression, see Morgan (2004), 146. 
(21) As Schirren (2005), 45 points out, it is strange that our narrator knows 
Damis’ intention to record everything about Apollonius. Where does his 
knowledge come from? Is it written in the Damis document itself, or did Juila 
tell it to him? 
(22) This recurrent phrase will be discussed later (p. 75).  
(23) The point made also by Whitmarsh (2004), 429. Cf. Billault (2009), 9: ‘La 
biographie est par nature lacunaire’. 
(24) For the narrator’s use of the verb, see Knoles (1981), 31-2. 
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(25) Damis’ first meeting with Apollonius and his assumption of the role as a 
faithful follower are fully described at 1.19-20. 
(26) Briefly discussed by Knoles (1981), 53-8.  
(27) Interestingly, some accounts are said to come from Apollonius. See e.g. 3.2  
(Ἀπολλώνιος … τὸ … θηρίον ἑωρακέναι φησὶ, ‘Apollonius says he saw the beast’) 
and 3.15 (Ὁποῖοι … οἱ ἄνδρες καὶ ὅπως οἰκοῦντες τὸν ὄχθον, αὐτὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ δίεισιν, ‘The 
man [sc. Apollonius] himself recounts in detail what the men are like and how 
they lived on the hill’). 
(28) Above pp. 65-6.  
(29) 7. 152.3: ‘I have to tell what is told but at least I do not have to believe all 
the things, and this remark is to be applied to the whole work).’ (ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω 
λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω 
ἐς πάντα λόγον·) 
(30) Cf. Guez (2009), 246-7. 
(31) Other occurences are e.g. 1.32, 3.17, 5.7, 6.12, 7.15. 
(32) This sounds like the work’s title. See above n. 3. 
(33) The word is difficult to translate into one simple English word. It would 
mean either ‘this book’ or ‘the logic of the story’. This is, however, not relevant 
to the following discussion. 
(34) Cf. above n. 33. 
(35) I use the term in the sense offered by Wayne C. Booth: when the narrator 
deviates from the norm set by the implied author, he is called ‘unreliable’ 
(Booth (1983), 158-9). 
(36) Cf. Gyselinck and Demoen (2009), 125. 
(37) The word σπουδαῖος (‘serious’) and its cognates σπουδή (‘seriousness’) and 
σπουδάζω (‘be serious’) appear many times in the work, especially in the 
description of Apollonius (e.g. 2.23 (σπουδάζοντι), 3.41 (σπουδάς), 6.3 
(ἐσπουδάσθη)). I would say their frequent appearance, paradoxically, 
strengthens the work’s playfulness; the more the work emphasises its 
protagonist’s seriousness, the more comical he looks to the reader. We can 
detect Philostratus’ awareness of the opposition of the ‘serious’ and the ‘light’, 
when Apollonius is described as ‘mixing the serious and the light’ (4.11: ἀναμὶξ 
παίξας τε καὶ σπουδάσας (see also 6.27)) in his conversation with his followers. 
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(38) Cf. Ní Mheallaigh (2008), 403. 
(39) Above pp. 74-5. 
(40) The term ‘Second Sophistic’ was coined by Philostratus himself. Relevant 
passages are found at his Lives of the Sophists 481 and 507 (cf. Whitmarsh 
(2001), 41-5). 
(41) Billault (2009), 19 argues that the Apollonius has a ‘metanarrative 
dimension’ as it includes in itself discourses about its composition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
